Abstract: Daily returns of stock markets in 27 emerging markets in Asia, Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe from the early 1990s through 2006 are analyzed for the possible presence of nonlinear speculative bubbles. The absence of these is tested for by studying residuals of VAR-based fundamentals, using the Hamilton regime-switching model and the rescaled range analysis of Hurst. For the first test absence of bubbles is rejected for 24 countries (except Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan), and for the second it is rejected for 26 (except Malaysia). BDS testing on residuals after ARCH effects are removed fails to reject further nonlinearity in the residual series for all countries.
Introduction
This paper combines methods used in Ahmed and Rosser (1995) and in Ahmed et al. (1997) 1 to test for the absence of excessively rapid movements of price movements in daily stock market indices in 27 emerging market economies from the early 1990s through 2006 as well as to test for absence of nonlinearities beyond ARCH effects.
Failure to reject such absences is seen as possible evidence for the presence of nonlinear speculative bubbles in such markets. This would confirm a widely held perception that many such markets have exhibited such bubbles, possibly even more so than the markets of either more fully developed or less developed economies (although we do not test for either of these last hypotheses). While such bubbles are seen as destabilizing and disruptive to these economies in many ways, they are also seen as often accompanying waves of real investment that are crucial to the development process.
Our method is to estimate time-series for likely fundamentals of the daily stock market indices using vector autoregressions (VAR) of the stock market indices with a leading country interest rate, the country's foreign exchange rate, and a world interest rate. We then subject the time-series of residuals of this hypothesized fundamental series for each country to two separate tests for excessively rapid movements away from the fundamental (or more precisely test for the absence of such movements). The first test is the regime switching test due to Hamilton (1989) and the second is the rescaled range analysis (RRA) due originally to Hurst (1951) . ARCH effects are then estimated for this 1 Ahmed and Rosser (1995) and Ahmed et al (1996) studied such phenomena in the Pakistani stock market while Ahmed et al (1997) looked at such bubbles in closed-end country funds. In addition, Ahmed et al (1999) studied the stock markets of 10 Pacific Basin economies, while Ahmed et al (2006) focused on the Chinese stock markets of the 1990s, this last paper using the methodology in this paper. The current study moves beyond the earlier ones by using both the Hamilton regime switching approach and the rescaled range analysis of Husrt, along with looking at a much larger set of countries' stock markets.
residual series and removed, with this remaining series being tested for the absence of additional nonlinearities using the BDS test . With the exception of the Hurst test for Malaysia, in all other tests we significantly at the 1% level fail to reject the absence of such nonlinear bubbles.
A number of efforts have been made recently by others to study such dynamics in one form or another in such markets, with much of the focus being on the especially volatile stock markets of China. 2 Ruan et al (2005) used the RRA approach of Hurst to consider the Chinese stock markets and evidence of fractal structure in the speculative dynamics. Jiang et al (2006) found long memory in the Chinese and Japanese stock markets using detrended fluctuation analysis, indicative of failure of the efficient market hypothesis. While Lei and Kling (2006) found that regulations in the Chinese markets restricting futures market activities reduced liquidity, this did not prevent the apparent emergence of a bubble that peaked in late 2007 and crashed since then. 3 In addition, Sarkar and Mukhopadhyay (2005) found a variety of anomalies and nonlinear dependence in Indian stock markets, and Lim et al (2005) found nonlinearities beyond GARCH in eight Asian stock markets. Finally, Ciner and Kargozoglu (2008) have found such nonlinear bubbles to arise from asymmetric information in the Turkish stock market.
At this point we warn of an important caveat that attends to this analysis. This is the ubiquitous problem of the misspecified fundamental, first identified by Flood and Garber (1980) . The problem is that to identify a bubble one must be certain that one has correctly identified the fundamental series from which it is seen to be deviating sharply from. What one sees as a bubble might actually be the fundamental if it reflects rational expectations of a substantial increase in the future of the fundamental that simply turns out not to be realized. Only a few assets can avoid this problem to some extent, with closed-end funds whose fundamentals are the values of the assets constituting them (with some adjustment for tax or liquidity matters) being such an example (Ahmed et al, 1997) .
Thus, while our approach to estimate the fundamental series for these stock markets has been used by others (Canova and Ito, 1991) , we cannot guarantee that we have determined proper fundamentals for these stock markets. So, even though the evidence we present is quite strong for almost all of these markets, it cannot be viewed as conclusive. However, even if we cannot say for certain that we have identified speculative bubbles, the econometric techniques we use can be said to identify sharp movements that can be identified as at least constituting "high volatility."
In the following sections we shall consider theoretical issues of speculative bubbles, then carry out the regime switching tests, the rescaled range tests, and the nonlinearity tests. These will be followed by concluding policy remarks.
Theoretical Problems of Speculative Bubbles
The conventional theoretical approach to speculative bubbles in the financial economics literature has been to identify it as a price of an asset staying away from the fundamental value of the asset for some extended period of time. While it is easier to theoretically hypothesize the existence of stationary bubbles that can easily arise in overlapping generations models, even with homogeneous agents possessing rational expectations (Tirole, 1985) , such as has been argued is the case for fiat monies with positive values (whose fundamental values are presumably zero, or barely above it, "the value of the paper the money is printed on"), such bubbles are essentially impossible to identify in practice. It is the exploding bubbles, or at least the sharply increasing ones, that we have any hope of empirically observing, even if the theory behind how they can arise is less general than that for the stationary bubbles.
In any case, this standard approach would be to identify a bubble by
where t is the time period, b is the bubble value, p is the price of the asset, f is the fundamental value of the asset, and ε is an exogenous stochastic noise process, usually posited to be i.i.d., although we recognize that in practice asset returns in many financial markets exhibit kurtosis and other non-Gaussian properties.
As already noted in our discussion of Flood and Garber's work, the problem here is identifying the fundamental. In theory for simple financial assets, this is argued to be the present discounted sum of future, rationally expected net returns on the asset. At a higher level this in turn presumably is part of a broader, intertemporal general equilibrium in the economy, although the possibility of multiple such equilibria is one possible fly in the ointment. Another is that the fundamental itself may be changing over time in some complicated way, which cannot be easily modeled, and indeed this is part of the argument of Flood and Garber. We also note that there are schools of thought that may deny that a fundamental may be knowable due to fundamental uncertainty, such as the Post Keynesians (Davidson, 1994) , or that argue that searching for fundamentals is irrelevant because all that matters are short-term dynamics at high frequencies, which is the view of some developers of the econophysics approach (Bouchaud and Potters, 2003) .
In any case, we shall stick with the more conventional approach of assuming that the fundamental exists and can be known, although an interpretation of Equation (1) is that the stochastic noise process is actually the process of random changes of that fundamental.
Even if one knows what the fundamental is, economic theory places severe limits on the possibility of speculative bubbles. Tirole (1982) demonstrated that speculative bubbles are impossible in a world of infinitely-lived, homogeneous, rational agents, trading a positively valued asset in discrete time periods. The key to this theorem is backward induction, that agents know that the bubble must crash eventually and so will not hold the asset in the period before then as they know there will be no other agents to sell it to. That means they will also not hold it in the period before, and so on, all the way back to the present, which means that nobody will ever even become involved in a bubble at all ever. Since Tirole proved his result there has been a large literature examining how and in what ways bubbles might arise as these various conditions are relaxed.
One famous model that allows for rational bubbles is due to Blanchard and Watson (1982) , that of the stochastically crashing rational bubble. In this situation there is a bubble with prices rising, but as they rise, the probability of a crash back to the fundamental also rises. This calls forth a requirement for traders to earn a risk premium to buy the asset to cover them for this rising probability of a crash. This in turn suggests a bubble that must rise at an accelerating rate. Not all bubbles have been observed to do that, although some have sometimes (Elwood et al, 1999) . One aspect of this sort of bubble is that it will explode to infinity in finite time, thereby bringing it to an end in finite time. Some have used this as a way to predict the peaks of bubbles, although a very public effort to forecast peaks of some bubbles based on this method (Didier et al, 2005) did not work out (Lux, 2009) .
At the opposite extreme from the various models of rational bubbles is the view that bubbles are inherently totally irrational, with agents, including even professional traders, falling into overly optimistic moods during speculative booms, to be followed by emotions of more negative and panicky sorts after a bubble peaks. Shiller (2005) is a strong advocate of this view and presents the data and arguments to support it in detail, with this view tracing back to the late Charles Kindleberger, his mentor, Hyman Minsky, and even to some classical political economists from the 1700s.
A more widely used approach has been to look to the middle between these vews of agents, to accept that they are heterogeneous in many ways, including that some may have rational expectations while others do not. While there had been an older literature that accepted this (Baumol, 1957) , sometimes emphasizing a conflict between "fundamentalists" who stabilize the market by buying when the asset price is below the fundamental and selling when the asset price is above the fundamental and the "chartists" who tend to chase trends in the price dynamic and thus destabilize the market, creating excess volatility, if not necessarily outright bubbles (Zeeman, 1974) . This view fell out of favor as the 1970s proceeded, and the rational expectations revolution took place, with the theorem of Tirole (1982) a high water mark of rejecting this approach.
The idea of using heterogeneous agents was revived by Black (1986) , who posited the existence of "noise" traders who followed no particular strategy or rule, or arbitrary ones, and who interacted with a group having rational expectations. Depending on the strategies they used, the noise traders could at times destabilize markets and create bubbles, much like the chartists of older models. Day and Huang (1990) followed this with a model that added market makers to this setup and showed the possibility of a wide variety of dynamic paths for asset prices, including dynamically chaotic ones. Impetus for such an approach increased after DeLong et al (1991) demonstrated that such noise traders could not only survive but even thrive in markets that also contained traders with rational expectations, thus overturning an old argument that such traders would lose money and be driven from the markets.
Eventually this general approach evolved to allow for wider varieties of heterogeneous interacting agents, who could learn and change strategies over time, with
Föllmer et al (2005) providing a general theoretical perspective on such approaches and
Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006) providing broad summaries and reviews of them.
We shall look briefly at one such model that can produce a wide variety of dynamic paths, due to Bischi et al (2006) , which in turn draws on Chiarella et al (2003) , a discrete choice model of agents whose strategies evolve over time in response to their performance. This approach was initiated by Brock and Hommes (1997) and further developed in a more general way by Brock and Durlauf (2001) .
So, in Bischi et al (2006) we find the following setup, which is in discrete time steps, t. The basic unknown price dynamics are given in Equation (2), where w is a measure of excess demand and g(w(t)) then measuring "the influence of excess demand on current price variations," with g(0) = 0 and g'(w(t)) > 0. The final term is composed of a Gaussian noise term, ε, with σ being its standard deviation,
Individual agents, i, act on utility functions that include a term, J, that represents their sensitivity to what other agents are doing, in effect the determinant of herding behavior, or "proportional spillovers," as well as expectational terms about price and excess demand, which are indicated by a superposed *. This is shown in Equation (3),
Price expectations formation is given by by Equation (4),
with ρ representing a "speed of adjustment" parameter such that ρ ε [0,1]. In turn, expectations regarding excess demand is given in Equation (5), which includes a parameter, β, which indicates the degree of willingness of agents to change their strategies,
It turns out that the nature of the dynamics are ultimately shaped by the respective values of β and J, with generally speaking more volatile and complex dynamics arising when these parameters are of higher values above certain critical levels.
4 More generally this model is able to replicate patterns that we see regularly in actual financial markets, in which periods of relatively stable behavior alternate with periods of heightened volatility. These are driven by oscillations in which strategies are dominant among the agents at any given time. In the original Brock and Hommes (1997) model, these oscillations arise as agents face costs for information, and so that it pays to get the information to pursue a stabilizing strategy of a rational expectations fundamentalist sort when the system is far from the fundamental, but to abandon such costly strategies for possibly destabilizing rule of thumb strategies during periods when the system is remaining nearer the fundamental. This gives rise to the observed oscillation between the dominance of stabilizing versus destabilizing strategies among the agent population.
We close this section by noting that this is simply a representative model, which we are not attempting to estimate per se in what follows, which uses a more generic timeseries approach, although we do model the fundamental with a vector autoregression (Engle, 1982) that uses certain macroeconomic variables.
An overview of emerging markets developments:
The countries included in our sample (emerging markets) have seen fundamental and structural changes in their economies and financial markets over the study period, roughly 1993-2005. Table 1 portrays salient features of these economies for year 1992 and 2005, beginning and ending of the study period.
As Table 1 shows, the sample includes large economies in terms of GDP (e.g., China, Mexico and Russia) as well as small economies (e.g., Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh), and countries at various stages of development, in terms of Gross National Income per capita (e.g., Bangladesh and Singapore). There is also a considerable disparity in their growth rate over the period, and economic structure. Comparing the beginning of the study period (1992) statistics with the end of the period statistics (2005), one can see that overall the economies have experienced substantial economic growth as well as structural changes, in terms of industrialization (value added by industry as a percentage of GDP)
as well openness of the economy, measured as the value of merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP. These countries have also been able to attract substantial amounts of foreign direct investment, though again the disparity is remarkable. An important development has been the increasing role of the capital markets in the counties' economies. The total market capitalization for the countries in the sample increased from US$ 1.1 trillion to $3.7 trillion over the period 1992-05. The Market capitalization as a percentage of the GDP increased on average for the group from 36% to 90%. Table 2 provides salient statistics for the stock markets in the sample countries for the year 1992 instruments may reduce the broader resilience of the financial system, even as they increase the ability of agents to manage risk in the short run.
Data and Methodology:
We examine daily returns behavior in the sample countries over periods of 15 to 18 years, depending on the availability of the data for each country. For each country, we use daily values of the market's major index, and compute stock index 'returns' as the first log differences; R I,t = ln(Index t ) -ln(Index t-1 ). These index returns were then used in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with those of daily interest rates, daily exchange rates and World Stock indices as a measure of the presumptive fundamental. Two alternative series of interest rates were used; the first representing short-term rates for 30-days or less maturity and the second set of interest rate series represented rates on relatively longer-term one year maturity instruments. These interest rates were proxied, depending on the availability of data for each country, by various rates series, including CD rate, inter-bank overnight rate, T-Bill auction yields, bank base rates, and bank loan Next, we remove the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects from this VAR residual series. These residual series are then used to conduct regime-switching tests. Tables 3a to 3za show the daily stock market returns for all 27 countries Regime Switching Tests Hamilton (1989) introduced an approach to regime switching tests that can be used to test for trends in time series and switches in trends, as used in Engel and Hamilton (1990) and van Norden and Schaller (1993) . We use this approach as our main test for the null of no bubbles on the residual series derived above which is given by
where
and z t -z t-1 = Ν 1 (z t-1 -z t-2 ) +…+Ν r (z t-r -z t-r-1 ) + γ t 
Following Engel and Hamilton (1990) a "no bubbles" test proposes a null hypothesis of no trends given by p = 1 -q. This is tested by with a Wald test statistic given by
The critical value for rejecting the null of no trends is χ 2 = 3.8. Results are reported in 
Hurst Persistence Tests
Hurst (1951) developed a test to study persistence of Nile River annual flows, which was first applied to economic data by Mandelbrot (1972) . For a series x t with n observations, mean of x*m and a max and a min value, the range R(n) is
(12) j=1 j=1
The scale factor, S(n, q) is the square root of a consistent estimator for spectral density at frequency zero, with q < n, q S(n, q) 2 = g 0 + 2Σw j (q)g j , w j (q) = 1 -[j/(q-1)],
j=1 with g's autocovariances and w's weights based on the truncation parameter, q, which is a period of short-term dependence. 5 The classical Hurst case has q = 0, which reduces the scaling factor to a simple standard deviation. Feller (1951) showed that if x t is a Gaussian i.i.d. series then
with H = 1/2, which implies integer integrodifferentiation and thus standard Brownian motion, the "random walk." H is the Hurst coefficient, which can vary from zero to one with a value of 1/2 implying no persistence in a process, a value significantly less than 1/2 implying "anti-persistence" and a value significantly greater than 1/2 implying positive persistence. The significance test involves breaking the sample into sub-samples (namely, pre-bubble, during-bubble and post-bubble period) and then estimating a Chow test on the null that the subperiods possess identical slopes. This technique is also called rescaled range analysis. Sub-samples are determined on visual examination of the entire stock returns series. Underlying conditions for these episodes (in sub-samples) are discussed later in this paper. Results are reported for a test of a model with the intercept suppressed, the computed F values are above the critical values leading to the rejection of the null that there is no persistence. .
Nonlinearity Tests
We test for nonlinearity of the VAR residual series in two stages. The first is to remove ARCH effects. Engle (1982) the nonlinear variance dependence measure of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) as This test is subject to severe small sample bias with a cutoff of 500 observations sufficient to overcome this, a minimum both of our daily series easily achieve. Of course, just as our earlier tests are subject to the validity of our original VAR specifications, likewise so is this test. We also emphasize that the nature of the remaining nonlinearity remains unknown.
Conclusions
We have shown that for a set of 27 emerging markets around the world, there is Therefore, while we recognize that we may not have accurately specified the fundamental of the stock market series for each country, at a minimum we have shown that the stock markets in just about all of these countries have exhibited considerable volatility during this time period, which is in effect what the tests we have used can be said to definitely show. Even if these are not all true speculative bubbles, the markets in these countries have been subject to large and sudden fluctuations. That many of these fluctuations are likely to be due to speculative bubbles is further given by the fact that these fluctuations have tended to be far greater than the underlying flucuations of macroeconomic variables as shown in our general tables for them, although some of the countries did experience severe recessions, especially in the mid-to-late 1990s. Certainly the reporting and anecdotal evidence out of most of these countries suggests that market participants have believed that they have observed such bubbles during this period.
To the extent that four of the countries may not have shown them, namely
Mexico, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Malaysia, we are not able to determine any common pattern for this observation, and none of these countries failed to reject the null hypothesis for all the tests we used. Of these, we note that Malaysia has had controls on international capital movements, along with a partially Islamic banking system, which may have reduced the fluctuations of its stock market. However, we are not able to identify any particular characteristics of the other countries that have might done so.
The apparently widespread prevalence of such bubbles certainly raises policy challenges for the governments of these countries. Participants in financial markets often dislike large variability, although they tend to be more unhappy when that variability is associated with market declines than when it is associated with market increases. Indeed, while many governments seek to stabilize these markets if they can, it may well be that such bubbles are an inevitable part of the development of financial systems in emerging market economies, and, of course, markets in more developed and established economies are not immune to such fluctuations either.
The conundrum for policymakers is that while bubbles can distort economic allocation and activity, it may also be a useful part of a development strategy.
Theoretical models of smooth growth do not reflect the reality of the development experience. In reality development involves spurts of growth associated with investment surges in particular sectors. Such investment surges may well require outbreaks of excessive enthusiasm, the "animal spirits" of Keynes, in order to bring forth the investment surge. Such outbreaks of enthusiasm will readily show up in stock markets as outbreaks of enthusiasm regarding the stock in such a sector, with the likelihood of speculative bubbles in those stocks emerging. Indeed, as long as there are financial markets exist it may be impossible to avoid speculative bubbles, given the increasing experimental evidence that the tendency to such bubbles may be deeply rooted in the human psyche, occurring even when agents are fully informed about the situations that they are in (Porter and Smith, 1994) .
Of course the events of late 2008 caution that the improvements in efficiency and availability of finance for development investment may also bring risks and dangers, with many of these indeed tied precisely to this possibility of bubbles. However, the experience of this crisis suggests that these problems are broader and may affect any economy whose financial markets are connected with those of the rest of the world.
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